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STATEMENT OF ISSUE CERTIFIED 
The Utah Supreme Court has accepted the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' certified 
question of state law as follows: 
As to the Edizone case described by the certification order, whether the 
defense costs should be allocated between Appellant and Appellee under the" equal 
shares" method set forth in the "other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or 
according to the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This certification arises out of Appellant, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's ("Ohio") 
appeal of the federal district court's order, granting Unigard Insurance Company's 
("Unigard") motion for partial summary judgment, issued on November 14, 2006. Ohio 
appeals only that portion of the federal district court's order, requiring that defense costs in 
defending an underlying action, Edizone, LC v. Cloud Nine, LLC, et al.9 Civil No. 
1:04CV00117 TS ("Edizone Action"), be split equally between Unigard and Ohio, based 
upon the "other insurance" clauses in the successive policies. (Attachments, pp. 1 -17; Aplt. 
App. v. 13, pp. 2062 - 2078). The federal district court's order with respect to all other 
issues was not appealed by Ohio. 
This case originally concerned a request for declaratory judgment to determine the rights 
and obligations, if any, of West American Insurance Companyl ("West American"), Ohio 
and Unigard to provide defense and indemnity to Cloud Nine, LLC, and its principals 
("Cloud Nine") in the Edizone Action, a civil suit brought by a product and technology 
developer, Edizone, L.C. ("Edizone"), which licensed patents and other intellectual property 
to the Cloud Nine for manufacture and sale of a elastomer gel technology and product known 
1
 Unigard has admitted and agreed that none of the allegations in the Edizone Action 
alleged a covered advertising injury against Cloud Nine that could have occurred during 
the effective periods of the insurance policies issued by West American (June, 1998, 
through June, 2001), and therefore, no claim is made that West American owes a duty to 
defend or indemnify Cloud Nine and the entirety of the Appellant's brief will deal only 
with Ohio's duty under its insurance contract. 
2 
as "Gelastic" and "GellyComb". (Aplt. App. v. 1-2, pp. 16 - 438). 
Ohio insured Cloud Nine for a one-year period from 6/10/2001 to 6/10/2002. (Aplt. App. 
v. 1, p. 19,1f 12). Cloud Nine had no insurance from 6/10/2002 to 12/12/2002. (Aplt. App. 
v. 6, p. 1091). Unigard thereafter insured Cloud Nine for the three-year period from 
12/12/2002 to 12/12/2005. (Aplt. App. v. 3, p. 565, ] 2). 
On May 22, 2006, Unigard filed its motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that 
both Ohio and Unigard had a duty to defend Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action and that all 
defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine should be split equally (50/50) between 
Unigard and Ohio.2 (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 623 - 658). Unigard based its argument upon the 
"other insurance" clause terms contained within the subject successive, non-concurrent 
policies issued by Ohio and Unigard. (Aplt. App. v. 3 pp. 654 - 656). Ohio opposed 
Unigard's motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Unigard's reliance upon the 
"other insurance" clauses contained within the Ohio and Unigard policies was not supported 
by the plain language of the "other insurance" clauses themselves, case law interpreting such 
clauses, insurance law treatises, or the required "time on the risk" method of apportionment 
of defense costs required by this Court's decision in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and 
Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 141-142 (1997). (Aplt. App. v. 6, pp. 1089 - 1091). 
2
 On June 20, 2006, Cloud Nine filed its joinder to Unigard's motion for partial summary 
judgment, however, it only joined in Unigard's coverage arguments and did not join in 
Unigard's or any other arguments related to allocation of defense costs. (Aplt. App. v. 5, 
pp. 1037-1040. Thus, Cloud Nine has waived any argument on this issue. 
3 
On September 21, 2006, the district court heard oral argument, Judge Tena Campbell 
presiding. (Aplt. App.v. 13,pp. 2155-2174). On November 14,2006, the federal district 
court issued its ruling, granting Unigard' s motion for partial summary judgment and ordering 
all defense costs and fees in the Edizone Action be shared equally between Ohio and Unigard 
without regard to each insurers' time on the risk. (Attachments, pp. 1-17; Aplt. App. v. 13, 
pp. 2062 - 2078). As a basis for its ruling, the federal district court relied on the "other 
insurance" clause terms contained within the non-concurrent, successive policies issued by 
Ohio and Unigard. (Attachments, pp. 15 - 17; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2076 - 2078). 
On November 28, 2006, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Ohio filed a motion to 
reconsider the courts order allocating defense costs. (Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2079 - 2110). 
The district court denied Ohio's motion to reconsider on January 24, 2007. (Attachments, 
pp. 18-20; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2132-2134). 
On November 27, 2007, the federal district court's order, granting Unigard's motion for 
partial summary judgment and allocating defense costs became a final and appealable order 
when all remaining claims not decided by said order were dismissed, with prejudice, as Ohio 
and Unigard settled all claims asserted against Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action. 
(Attachments, pp. 21 -23; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2144-2146). Thereafter, Ohio timely filed 
its Notice of Appeal on December 27,2007. (Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2147 - 2150). 
Ohio and Unigard fully briefed the issues on appeal and submitted them to the Tenth 
Circuit. 
4 
Oral argument was held on the case before the Tenth Circuit on January 14,2009. Barbara 
K. Berrett argued for Ohio and Rebecca L. Hill argued for Unigard and the case was 
submitted to Judges Henry, Brisco and Lucero. Subsequently on April 28, 2009, Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeal Judges Henry, Brisco and Lucero certified a question of state law 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court, by order accepted the question certified to it on June 18,2009. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 6,2005, Ohio filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment to determine the rights 
and obligations, if any, of West American, Ohio and Unigard in providing defense and 
indemnification for Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action. (Aplt. App. v. 1-2, pp. 16 - 438). 
The Edizone Action was a civil suit brought by a product and technology developer, 
Edizone, which licensed patents and other intellectual property to the Cloud Nine for 
manufacture and sale of an elastomer gel technology and product known as "Gelastic" and 
"GellyComb". (Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 54 - 103). From April 7,1998 until March 11, 2002, 
Cloud Nine had a license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use Edizone's 
trademarks and intellectual property. Id. However, on March 11,2002, Edizone terminated 
Cloud Nine's license for failure to pay Edizone and other issues. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 61, ^ | 
47). 
Notwithstanding the earlier license tenmnation on March 11,2002, Edizone alleged that 
Cloud Nine continued to make, sell, and/or alter the elements of GellyComb products in 
5 
violation of its intellectual property rights. (Aplt App v. 1, pp. 62 - 63). As a result of 
Cloud Nine's alleged infringement of Edizone's patents, trademarks, and tradenames while 
marketing, advertising, and selling Cloud Nine's products, Edizone filed suit on August 26, 
2004. (Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 54 - 103). 
During the period of time that the alleged infringing acts occurred, Cloud Nine was insured 
by separate, non-concurrent insurance policies issued by Ohio3 and Unigard.4 Ohio provided 
insurance coverage to Cloud Nine for one year - June 10,2001 to June 10,2002. (Aplt. App. 
v. 2, p. 323). Unigard provided insurance coverage for a three-year period from December 
12,2002 to December 12,2005. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 632,665; v. 5, pp. 820 - 984). During 
the six-month gap between the expiration of the Ohio policy on June 10, 2002, and the 
inception of the Unigard policy on December 12,2002, Cloud Nine was uninsured. There is 
nothing in the record as to why Cloud Nine was uninsured for this six month gap. 
As noted above, for the nine months of Ohio's policy from June 10,2001 until March 11, 
2002, Cloud Nine had a license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use Edizone's 
trademarks and intellectual property, thus, Edizone could not and did not assert claims for 
any advertising injury during that period. Accordingly, Ohio only had three months on the 
risk, dating from the termination of the license agreement to the end of its policy period, i.e.: 
3
 Ohio Casualty Insurance Policy No. BKO (02) 52343482 effective June 10,2001 to 
June 10, 2002. (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 19, v. 2, pp. 322-437). 
4
 Unigard Insurance Company Policy No. CM007917 (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 632, 655, v. 5, 
pp. 820-984). Unigard issued three consecutive policies effective December 12, 2002 to 
December 12,2005. (Aplt. App. v. 3, pp. 565-570, v. 4, p. 665). 
6 
March 1L 2002 through June 10, 2002, during which an alleged advertising injury offense 
could have occurred. (Aplt. App. v. 2, pp. 323, 337)(emphasis added). 
The Ohio policy provided liability insurance coverage for personal and advertising injury 
from June 10,2001 to June 10,2002. (Aplt. App. v 2, p. 337). Specifically, Coverage B of 
the Ohio policy "Insuring Agreement," in pertinent part, provides: 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and 
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will 
have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" 
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does 
not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense 
and settle any claim or "suit" that may result. 
b. This insurance applies to: 
..."personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense 
arising out of your business but only if the offense was 
committed in the "coverage territory" during the policy period. 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337)(emphasis added). 
The Ohio policy further contained an "other insurance" clause, that provides for equal 
sharing of defense costs for a covered loss, if and only if other valid and collectible 
insurance is available to the insured for a loss covered by the Ohio policy. (Aplt. App. v. 2, 
pp. 342 - 343)(emphasis added). Specifically, the policy stated in relevant part: 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured 
7 
for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage 
Part, our obligations are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below 
applies. If this insurance is primary, our 
obligations are not affected unless any of the 
other insurance is also primary. Then, we will 
share with all that other insurance by the method 
described in c. below. 
c. Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution 
by equal shares, we will follow this method also. 
Under this approach each insurer contributes 
equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit 
of insurance or none of the loss remains, 
whichever comes first. 
If any other insurance does not permit 
contribution by equal shares, we will contribute 
by limits. Under this method, each insurer's share 
is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of 
insurance to the total applicable limits of 
insurance of all insurers. 
(Aplt. App. v. 2, pp. 342-343)(emphasis added). 
Unigard's subsequent policies beginning on December 12, 2002, also provided for 
personal and advertising injury liability coverage and its insuring provision and its "other 
insurance" clauses were identical to those under Ohio's policy. (Aplt. App. v.4, p. 632; v. 5. 
pp. 924 - 925). Additionally, Unigard's three policies issued to Cloud Nine provided 
$1,000,000.00 policy limits per year for tliree years. (Aplt. App. v. 3, pp. 565; v. 5, p. 906). 
8 
The Ohio one-year policy also had a $1,000,000.00 policy limit. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 324). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Ohio and Unigard policies were successive and not 
concurrent, Unigard filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 22,2006, arguing 
among other issues that as a matter of law all defense costs incurred in defending Cloud Nine 
should be split equally (50/50) between Unigard and Ohio. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 654 - 656). 
Unigard's argument was based upon the policies "other insurance" clauses that provided for 
an equal distribution of defense costs when other valid and collectible insurance is available 
to the insured for a loss covered by the policy. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 655 - 656). 
On August 21,2006, Ohio responded to Unigard's motion for summary judgment arguing, 
in part, that the "other insurance" clause only applies to concurrent coverage of another 
insurer for losses that occurred during the June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002 policy period. 
(Aplt. App. v. 6, pp. 1089 - 1091). Ohio further argued because the "other insurance" 
clause was inapplicable to successive insurance policies, the "time on the risk" defense cost 
allocation method mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel v. Corp. v. Aetna 
Cos. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (1997) controls. 
Nevertheless, the federal district court accepted Unigard's arguments and relying upon the 
"other insurance" clauses contained in Ohio and Unigard policies, held that all de fense costs 
and fees in the Edizone Action be shared equally between Ohio and Unigard witliout regard 
to each insurers' time on the risk. (Attachments, pp. 15-17; Aplt. App. v. 13, pp. 2076 -
9 
2078).5 
The federal district court's order was appealed, fully briefed and oral argument was held 
on January 14, 2009, before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has certified a legal question to this Court, asking 
whether under Utah law, the defense costs incurred by Ohio and Unigard in defending the 
insured in the underlying Edizone Action should be allocated between Ohio [Appellant] and 
Unigard [Appellee] under the "equal shares" method set forth in the "other insurance" 
clauses of Ohio's and Unigard's policies or according to the "time on the risk" method 
prescribed in this Court's opinion in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 931 
P.2d. 127,140 (Utah 1997). 
It is Ohio's position that the federal district court incorrectly relied upon the "other 
insurance" clauses contained in Ohio's and Unigard's policies to allocate the defense costs 
because the "other insurance" clauses are only applicable when there is concurrent coverage 
for the same loss actually covered by two or more insurance policies. Here, Ohio's and 
Unigard's insurance policies are successive and not concurrent, which Unigard's counsel 
5
 The total defense costs incurred in defending Cloud Nine in the Edizone Action were 
$2,698,950.77. As a result of the federal district court decision, Ohio has paid 
$1,304,558.10 in defense costs (in addition to settlement monies) although there were 
only three months during which Cloud Nine could have caused an advertizing offense 
during Ohio's policy because Cloud Nine had a licence agreement to advertise the goods 
until March 12,2002. 
10 
conceded during oral argument at the Tenth Circuit. Clearly then, the equal apportionment 
language in the "other insurance" clauses are not controlling, when determining the proper 
method of apportionment of defense costs in this case. 
The federal district court below, in reaching its conclusion in this matter, relied upon 
Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 210 (Utah 2006). However, the Benjamin case 
clearly does not address the issue of how insurance carriers should equitably allocate defense 
costs between successive insurance providers. Instead, Benjamin simply addresses the duty 
to defend when there are covered and non-covered claims asserted in the same lawsuit and 
one policy applies. See Benjamin 140 P.3d at 1216. Indeed, the Benjamin case did not 
involve a continuing injury claim spanning successive policies and policy years. In a 
continuing injury case such as the instant case, successive policies insure the same type of 
risk, but not the same risk, because to hold that successive policies cover the same risk would 
render an insurer liable for damage occurring outside its policy period. Ohio's policy covers 
personal injury and advertizing injury losses "only if the offense was committed... during its 
policy period." 
To avoid the time on the risk method of apportioning defense costs set forth in Sharon 
Steel, Unigard claims that the "other insurance" clauses, although not applicable here, 
constitute express policy language which decrees the method of apportionment. See Sharon 
Steel, 931 P.2d at 140. However, this is not the case. Again, at oral argument at the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Unigard's counsel conceded that the policies at issue in the Sharon 
11 
Steel case more than likely all had "other insurance" clauses in the policies, because "other 
insurance" clauses have been standard in CGL policies since approximately the 1950s. The 
"other insurance" clauses by their own language simply do not apply here as evidence of any 
such intent because the policies are successive and not concurrent. 
A similar analysis was recently made by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 454 Mass 337,910 N.E.2d290 (Mass. 2009) ("the 
Boston case"). That case, as here, involved the First Circuit Court of Appeals, certifying 
questions of state law regarding the allocation of damages amongst the insured, when self 
insured, and insurance carriers when there were successive policies in a "progressive 
injury"case. The Boston Court specifically looked at the "other insurance" clauses in 
standard CGL policies and found that those clauses do not reflect an intention to cover losses 
for damages outside the policy period and do not apply to successive coverage situations. Id. 
at 308-09. 
In this particular continuing injury case, as in Sharon Steel, and the Boston case, the only 
fair and equitable way of dividing the approximately two million dollars plus in defense costs 
among the parties here, is to use the "time on the risk" allocation adopted by this Court some 
years ago. Ohio therefore respectfully requests that this Court find that the other insurance 
clauses are not applicable here by the policies' own terms and that the defense costs should 
be divided amongst Ohio, Unigard and the insured by the time on the risk allocation method 
adopted by this Court in Sharon Steel 
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ARGUMENT 
I. OHIO'S AND UNIGARD'S "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES DO NOT 
APPLY IN THIS CASE, NOR DO THEY GOVERN THE ALLOCATION 
OF DEFENSE COSTS AS BETWEEN OHIO AND UNIGARD. 
In this case, Ohio's policy provides for equal sharing of defense costs for a covered 
loss, if and only if other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss 
covered by the policy. (Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 342 - 343) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
Ohio's "other insurance" clause states in relevant part:6 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the 
insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this 
Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If thus 
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of 
the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all 
that other insurance by the method described in c. below. 
b. Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we 
will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer 
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of 
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first. 
6
 The "other insurance" clause contained within Ohio's single policy effective June 10, 
2001 to June 10, 2002 is verbatim the same "other insurance" clause contained in all three 
of Unigard's policies effective December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. (Aplt. App. v. 
3, pp. 924-925. 
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If any other insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares, 
we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's 
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the 
total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers. 
(Aplt. App. v. 1, pp. 342 - 343)(emphasis added). 
For a "loss" to be covered by Ohio's policy it must occur during the policy period -
June 10,2001 to June 10,2002.7 (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337). Thus, in order to apply the 50/50 
loss allocation method provided within Ohio's "other insurance" clause, there must be other 
collectible insurance available to Cloud Nine for a loss covered during Ohio's effective 
policy period of June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002. In other words, to allocate costs equally 
among the insurers, Ohio and Unigard's policies must provide concurrent liability coverage 
for the same loss. 
Ohio and Unigard's policies are successive not concurrent. Ohio's policy coverage 
period was effective from June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 323). 
Unigard's policy coverage periods spanned from December 12,2002 to December 12,2005; 
beginning six months after the expiration of Ohio's policy period. (Aplt. App. v. 4, pp. 632, 
7
 Ohiofs Policy specifically states: 
1. Insuring Agreement. 
b. This insurance applies to: 
"personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising 
out of your business but only if the offense was committed . . 
.during the policy period. 
See (Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 337)(emphasis added). 
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665; v. 5, pp. 820 -984)(emphasis added). Because the policies are successive and not 
concurrent, any loss covered by any of Unigard's three policies would, by definition, not be 
covered by Ohio's single policy because it would have occurred outside Ohio's express 
policy coverage period. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337). 
Contrary to the federal district court's findings, a loss covered by Ohio' s policy cannot 
span beyond its express policy period into any of Unigard's policy periods and remain a 
covered loss for both carriers' policies. (Attachments, p. 16; Aplt. App. v. 13, p. 2077); In 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas & Surety. Co.. 931 P.2d 127. 141 (Utah 1997). this Court 
noted that "[i]nsurer has not contracted to pay defense costs for occurrences which took place 
outside the policy period" (emphasis added). Indeed the federal district court's decision 
focused on the broad interpretation of the single term "loss" contained within the "other 
insurance" clauses. (Attachments, p. 16; Aplt. App. v. 13, p. 2077). However, although the 
term "loss" used by itself may be interpreted broadly, its application must be limited by the 
express terms that surround it. Here, the term "loss" is followed by the terms "we cover." 
Thus, the "other insurance" clause's alternative methods of apportionment are limited to 
circumstances where other insurance is available for a loss actually covered by Ohio' s policy. 
As noted above, while it is true that a "loss" may span successive policy periods, it still must 
fall within Ohio's policy period to be a covered loss. (Aplt. App. v. 2, p. 337)(emphasis 
added). 
This is true even if the loss is the same type or kind of loss covered by Ohio's policy. 
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To invoke the "other insurance" clause, Unigard's policies must also provide liability 
coverage for the same time period as the Ohio policy, and they simply do not. (Aplt. App. v. 
2, p. 323; v. 4, pp. 632, 665; v. 5, pp. 820 -984). See e.g. Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004)(fmding that "other insurance" clauses are only 
applicable to concurrent coverage and do not apply to successive policies covering different 
policy periods); ^ 7:1, Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes (4th ed.) at 895 
(2001); Secura Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 497 N.W. 2d 230,232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); 
Alberici v. Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co., 664 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1995); NL Indus, v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 518 (D.NJ. 1996). To find otherwise, 
violates the plain meaning of the "other insurance" clauses' express terms and, in effect, 
improperly makes Ohio liable in part for occurrences outside the period expressly covered 
by its policy. Id. 
In Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., the Seventh Circuit specifically 
addressed the issue whether to applv "other insurance" clauses to successive policies in 
determining allocation of costs among different insurers that gives rise to this appeal. 388 
F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004). In Taco Bell, an insured corporation brought a declaratory 
judgment action against two successive liability insurers seeking a declaration that the 
insurers had a duty to defend it from claims alleging the misappropriation of an advertising 
campaign. Id at 1071. The trial court determined that both insurers had a duty to defend and 
further ordered, based upon the policies' "other insurance" clauses, that each insurer was 
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responsible for one half of the defense costs incurred. Id- at 1078. 
On appeal the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court's reliance on the "other 
insurance" clauses was improper because such clauses are not applicable in cases where "two 
policies, each with an 'other insurance' clause, insure merely the same kind of risk, but not 
the same risk because the policies are successive." Id. at 1079 (emphasis added). In 
addressing this issue the court stated: 
What is true though unremarked by the parties is that the ground on which the 
district court split the defense costs equally between the two insurers was 
highly questionable. The court relied on 'other insurance' clauses in the two 
policies. An 'other insurance' clause limits an insurer's liability when the risk 
he has insured against is also covered by another insurer's policy. If two 
insurers have identical other-insurance clauses in policies that cover the same 
risk, a common and deliciously simple solution is to divide the liability 
between them 50-50. But this analysis does not fit the case in which the two 
policies, each with an 'other insurance' clause, insure merely the same kind of 
risk, but not the same risk because the policies are successive. To apply 'other 
insurance' clauses in such a case would make insurers liable in part for 
occurrences outside the period covered by their policies. 
Id. (citations omitted.) 
This principle and proper interpretation and application of the "other insurance" 
clauses are aptly illustrated by the following analysis: 
Addressing the issues raised when several insurers cover the same risk req aires 
an understanding of what constitutes 'other insurance' and 'multiple 
insurance.' . . . "Other insurance" refers only to two or more policies insuring 
the same risk, and the same interest, for the benefit of the same person, during 
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the same period.8 Courts and litigants often liberalize this somewhat restrictive 
definition, describing the interplay between insurance policies as though there 
were no requirement of concurrent policies. Thus, consecutive policies may 
be thought to constitute "other insurance," so long as the risk and insured 
interest superficially remain the same. Such treatment or definition is seriously 
flawed, however, because while successive policies might insure the same type 
of risk, they do not insure the same risk. Moreover, so generous a definition 
wrongly suggests that insurers might be liable for damages occurring outside 
their policy periods. The fact that "other insurance" clauses in policies only 
operate when there is a concurrent coverage highlights9 these definitional 
problems. 
See Douglas R. Richmond, "Issues and Problems in 'Other Insurance,' Multiple Insurance 
8
 See American Ins. Co. v. Freeport Cold Storage, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1475, 1485 (D. 
Utah 1987); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561 (Ala. 1994); Insurance 
Co. ofN. Am. v. Nicholas, 533 S.W.2d 204,206 (Ark. 1976); Nolt v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 617 A.2d 578, 579- 84 (Md. 1993); McCormick v. Travelers Indem. 
Co., 496N.E.2d 174,176 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 
AAA N.W.2d 813, 819- 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 476 N.W.2d 392 
(Mich.), reh'g denied, 503 N.W.2d 442 (1991); Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 469 
N.W.2d 735,738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); B.K. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Michigan Mut. 
Ins. Co., 612N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (App. Div. 1994); Mutual Benefit bis. Co. v. 
GoschenhoppenMut. Ins. Co., 572 A.2d 1275,1277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); National 
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 425 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 n.4 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1992); State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v. Griffin, 888 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
9
 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilantlns. Co., 919F.2d235,241 (4th Cir. 
1990) (applying North Carolina law); In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 170 B.R. 222, 235-36 
(S.D.N .Y. 1994) (applying New York law); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Indus. 
Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 58- 59 (Ct. App. 1992); Pafco Gen. Ins. Co. v. Providence 
Washington Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 728, 729 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Continental Cos. Co. 
v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789,791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 991, 995 (N.J. 1994); Orsi v. Aetna Ins. Co., 703 
P.2d 1053,1058 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see Transamerica Ins. Group v. Turner Constr. 
Co., 601 N.E.2d473,476-77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Secura Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. 
Co., 497 N.W.2d 230,232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity 
& Cos. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994); Board of Vocational Educ. v. Janicki, 
All S.E.2d 822,825 (W. Va. 1992). 
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and Self-Insurance," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1376 - 77 (1995); ^ 7:1, Allan D. Windt, 
Insurance Claims and Disputes (4th ed.) at 895 (2001). See also, Securalns. Co. v. Cincinnati 
Ins. Ca, 497 N.W.2d 230,232 (Mich. Ct.App. 1993); Alberici v. Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co., 
664 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1995); NL Indus, v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 
518 (D.N.J. 1996). 
Although, the Taco Bell Court did ultimately affirm the trial court's equal allocation 
of defense costs, its ruling was not based on the "other insurance" clauses, rather it was based 
on Illinois law and the fact that neither party suggested any better method of dividing the 
costs. Id. at 1079. 
A new case, Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Co., 454 Mass. 337, 910 
N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 2009), rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on July 
24, 2009, provides a particularly persuasive and germane discussion of the very issue 
presented by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals here. In that case, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, just like the case here, certified questions of state law to the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts. 
In the Boston case, an insured, the Boston Gas Company ("Boston"), and former 
operator of a manufactured gas plant sued one of its general liability insurance carriers, 
Century Indemnity Company ("Century")* seeking a declaration that Century had a duty to 
indemnify it for all the cost of cleanup of an off-site, tar contaminated property caused by 
Boston's operations over many years. The case was filed in the federal district court of 
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Massachusetts and the case went to a jury. The federal district court entered a verdict in 
favor of the insured Boston and denied Century's post verdict motions. The case was 
appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, who certified three questions to the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 292. 
The first question certified was "where an insured is protected by a standard 
commercial general liability policy and incurs covered costs as a result of ongoing 
environmental contamination occurring over more than one year and the insurer provided 
coverage for less than the full period of years in which contamination occurred, should direct 
liability of the sued insurer be pro-rated in some manner among all insurers on the risk, 
limiting the direct liability of the sued insurer to its share but leaving the insured free to seek 
the balance from other insurers." Id. at 292-93. The second issue certified was "if some form 
of pro rata liability is called for in such circumstances, what allocation method or formula 
should be used?" Id. And finally, issue number three was "if a single insurer in such 
circumstances is subject to liability under more than one policy and each policy has a 
separate deductible or separate self insured retention, should the insured be able to collect 
covered losses from a single policy subject only to the policies deductible or self insured 
retention or should liability be reduced by the sum of the applicable self insured retention 
effectively allocating total liability across the policies of that insurer in effect during the 
contamination period." Id. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that in prior years the 
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Massachusetts Court of Appeals had found in similar circumstances involving a continuing 
injury (which it refers to as a "progressive injury"), had determined that a joint and several 
allocation should be used. The issue on allocation under these circumstances was one of first 
impression to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The Boston Court outlined the 
underlying facts of the case, noting that the off-site tar contamination occurred over 
numerous years and numerous policies and that for part of those years, the insured either had 
a self insured retention and/or a deductible applied. It likewise noted that in all the policies 
there were "other insurance" clauses similar to the "other insurance" clause presented here 
today. Id. at 296. It acknowledged that the First Circuit Court of Appeals in certifying the 
issues noted in its certification that there was a split of authority among other states and 
concluded that a "growing plurality5' of states apply the pro-rata allocation. Id. at 298. 
Ironically, the Boston Court, at page 303, and footnote 29, concluded that the State 
of Utah was among a number of other states, who adopted a pro-rata allocation and 
specifically cites the Sharon Steel opinion. Id. at 303 fn. 29. 
The Boston Court looked at all the various methods being used by various states today 
and then analyzed the standard CGL policies and concluded that "a pro-rata allocation of 
losses is consistent with, if not compelled by the most reasonable construction of the policies 
at issue here." Id. at 306. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked 
at the fact that the policies at issue were all limited to property damage which occurs during 
the policy period. It deteraiined that the most reasonable reading of provisions within a 
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policy that limit coverage for claims that happen during a policy period is that each insurer 
only provides coverage for liability attributable to the damages, or here offenses, occurring 
during the given policy period. Id. at 307. Indeed, the Boston Court stated: 
[T]he policies' "other insurance" clauses do not reflect an intention to cover 
losses for damages outside the policy period. Rather, the "other insurance" 
clauses simply reflect a recognition of the many situations in which concurrent 
not successive coverage would exist for the same loss. 
Id. at 308. 
Footnote 36, which accompanies the above referenced quote states exactly what Ohio 
has been saying here as follows: 
FN36. " 'Other insurance' refers only to two or more concurrent policies, 
which insure the same risk and the same interest, for the benefit of the same 
person, during the same period. However, 'other insurance' clauses are not 
intended to allocate liability among successive insurers because they do not 
insure the same risk and would unjustly make consecutive insurers liable for 
damages occurring outside their policy periods." 23 E.M. Holmes, Appleman 
on Insurance § 145.4[C], at 34 (2d ed. 2003). 
"Historically, 'other insurance' clauses were designed to prevent multiple 
recoveries when more than one policy provided coverage for a given loss.... 
An example of a typical multiple-coverage case is the situation in which a loss 
is incurred by an insured driver while driving an automobile of an insured 
owner with the owner's permission.... In such a case both policies clearly cover 
the entire loss." (Citations omitted.) Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 
138 N.J. 437,470, 650 A.2d 974 (1994). 
Id.at309fn.36. 
The Boston Court finally notes that in the policies at issue in that case, there was no 
so called "non-cumulation" clause which would provide continuing coverage beyond the 
policy period. Id. There is no "non-cumulation" clause in the Ohio policy either. The Boston 
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Court concluded that the policies there do not provide coverage for damages that occur 
outside the policy period, and thus the other insurance clauses do not apply. 
Likewise, under the plain language of the Ohio and Unigard policies, the "other 
insurance" clauses do not apply to allocate defense costs here and so this Court should find, 
as it did in Sharon Steel, that the proper method to allocate defense costs here is time on the 
risk. 
II. THE "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES FOUND IN THE OHIO AND 
UNIGARD POLICIES DO NOT CONSTITUTE "EXPRESS POLICY 
LANGUAGE THAT DECREES THE METHOD OF APPORTtONMENT" 
WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE APPLICATION OF THE TIME ON 
THE RISK ALLOCATION. 
Unigard has argued that, if in fact Unigard's policies do not technically constitute 
"other insurance," then Unigard contends that the "other insurance" clauses in the successive 
policies constitute the "express policy language that decrees a different method of 
apportionment" referred to in the Sharon Steel case that would obviate the need to apply a 
"time on the risk" allocation. Indeed, Unigard asserts, the "time on the risk" method 
implemented by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel was merely "guidance'' for the trial 
court when allocating defense costs. As foundation for this argument, Unigard argues that 
the Sharon Steel Court appeared to have found that the policies at issue in that case did not 
provide a method of apportionment, implying that the policies at issue in Sharon Steel did 
not contain "other insurance" clauses. See Unigard's Tenth Circuit Appellee Brief. Making 
such an inference would be incorrect. 
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As this Court is aware, Sharon Steel involved Aetna, Hartford and AMICO insurance 
contracts issued from January of 1966 through April of 1980. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas & Surety Co., et al, 931 P.2d at 130. "Other insurance" clauses originated in property 
insurance and were initially inserted to discourage an insured from over insuring against a 
particular loss. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Bogart, 111 P.2d 449,452 (Ariz. 1986); 
Sloviaczekv. Estate ofPuckett, 565 P.2d 564, 566 (1977). Thus, the idea of reducing an 
insurers liability where there was "other insurance" covering the loss originally protected the 
insurer against fraudulent recovery. Id. 
Nevertheless, "other insurance" provisions came to be included in many liability 
policies even though the possibility of over insurance inducing fraudulent claims was remote 
in such policies. Id. Indeed, as early as 1952 "other insurance" clauses were widely used in 
all liability insurance policies, including auto policies. See, e.g. Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. 
USF&G, Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Or. 1952). Thus, Unigard's assumption that there was not 
"other insurance" clauses in the policies interpreted in the Sharon Steel case, which ran from 
1966 to 1980, is unfounded and Unigard's counsel conceded this issue at oral argument 
before the Tenth Circuit. 
A more sound conclusion in keeping with case law and authoritative texts on this 
subject is that the Sharon Steel Court did not analyze the "other insurance" clauses because 
the policies in Sharon Steel, as in this case, were successive and not concurrent and thus the 
"other insurance" clauses were inapplicable. 
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Thus, Ohio requests that this Court answer the Tenth Circuit's certified question by 
declaring that the defense costs should be allocated by the "time on the risk" formula set 
forth in Sharon Steel and find that Ohio is only obligated to pay its share of defense costs in 
relation to the three months that it was on the risk when the insured could have caused an 
advertising injury. 
III. THE TIME ON THE RISK ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS IS THE 
MOST EQUITABLE METHOD AND IS THE ONLY METHOD 
CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY LANGUAGE AS WELL AS 
IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES. 
As an alternative argument, Unigard asserts that under the Benjamin v. Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co., 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2006) case, a general duty to defend shared among successive 
co-insurers justifies equal apportionment of defense costs as found by the district court. (Appellee's 
Brief at Tenth Circuit, pp. 17-25 ). However, in Utah, an insurer's duty to defend all covered and 
non-covered claims asserted in an action does not, standing alone, require or justify equal allocation 
of the costs incurred in that defense. In fact, as admitted by Unigard in its brief, the Benjamin 
decision does not address the issue of how insurance carriers should equitably allocate defense costs 
between successive insurance providers. (Appellee's Brief at the Tenth Circuit, p. 23). 
Utah law clearly distinguishes an insurer's duty to defend under a policy as separate and 
distinct from the allocation of incurred defense costs among successive insurers. Sharon Steel 
Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, et ai, 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997) 
(Acknowledging that the mere recognition that an insurer has a duty to defend does not resolve the 
issue of how, absent express contractual language, a trial court should equitably apportion those 
defense costs). A co-insurer's equal obligation to defend, at most, only provides an insurer the right 
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to seek contribution from a co-insurer to "pay its share of the defense expenses." Id. at 138 
(emphasis added). 
To determine the insurer's "share of the defense expenses" Utah courts apply an equitable 
approach that "better reflects what each insurer contracted to provide" taking into consideration the 
time that each insurer was on the risk and their respective policy limits. Sharon Steel Corporation 
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, etal, 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997). This determination 
of insurers' share based upon their respective time on the risk does not "essentially argue for 
adoption of a rule that an insurer has a duty to defend only those claims covered by its insurance 
policy," as advocated by Unigard. (Appellee's Tenth Circuit Brief, pp. 22 - 23). Indeed, the pro-rata 
mechanism of apportionment among insurers does not affect the contractual relationship between 
the insurer and insured that requires the insurer to provide a full defense to all claims. Texas 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association/Southwest Aggregates v. Southwest 
Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Texas Ct. App. 1999). 
Additionally, the equitable "time on the risk" formula does not limit or become inapposite 
of an insurer's duty to defend simply because the insured must bear part of those defense costs for 
the periods that it was uninsured, self-insured, or otherwise without coverage.10 Sharon Steel, 931 
P.2d at 141-142. In Utah, it is appropriate to treat the insured, here Cloud Nine, as an insurer for 
periods of time when it was without coverage and to apportion its "fair share" of defense costs. Id. 
1
 Unigard's assertion that Cloud Nine was without insurance for six months because it 
could not find insurance and Ohio refused to underwrite it, has no foundation in the 
record. There is literally no evidence or testimony as to why Cloud Nine went without 
insurance for six months, after Ohio did not renew its policy at the expiration of said 
policy. 
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Furthermore, allocating costs to an insured is not limited to only those circumstances where there 
were "large period[s] of time" that an insured was without coverage. It is not the length of time of 
non-coverage that governs apportionment to the insured, rather, it is the equitable approach to 
u[r]eflect a decision by an actor to assume or retain a risk." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 141, quoting 
Stonewall Ins, Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp,, 73 F.3d 1178, 1202 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Moreover, any objection to the apportionment of defense costs to Cloud Nine has been 
waived. Cloud Nine did not oppose Ohio's allocation arguments nor did it file a separate motion for 
summary judgment addressing the issue. (Aplt. App. v. 5, pp. 1037 -1040). 
The Boston Court extensively discussed the important public policy objections served by a 
pro-rata or time on the risk allocation among successive insurers and periods of time where an 
insured is without insurance. Indeed, it quoted the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit which recognized the public policy benefits for pro-rata allocation as follows: 
"[W]here the policies triggered are provided by multiple insurers, [pro rata] 
allocation avoids saddling one insurer with the full loss, the burden of bringing a 
subsequent contribution action, and the risk that recovery in such an action will prove 
to be impossible because, for instance, the insurer of other triggered policies is unable 
to pay.... Allocation results in the insured bearing the risk of any of its insurers' 
inability to pay, instead. There is logic in having the risk of such defalcation fall on 
the insured, which purchased the defaulting insurer's policy, rather than on another 
insurer which was a stranger to the selection process. 
"Allocation also forces an insured to absorb the losses for periods when it self-
insured and can prevent it from benefitting from coverage for injuries that took place 
when it was paying no premiums.... Allocation may also be more efficient because 
'any contribution proceeding will involve many of the same issues that are raised in 
the initial liability proceeding, and ... it is more efficient to deal with these issues in 
a single proceeding.' " 
Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 221 F.3d 207, 323 (2d. Cir. 2000), quoting 
In re Prudential Lines Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 85 (2d. Cir. 1998). 
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In our view, pro rata allocation produces a more equitable result than joint and 
several allocation, which "creates a false equivalence between an insured who has 
purchased insurance coverage continuously for many years and an insured who has 
*366 purchased only one year of insurance coverage." Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. 
Walks & Cos.,986 P.2d 924, 939-940 (Colo. 1999). This false equivalence would 
tend to "reduce[ ] the incentive of... property owners to insure against future risks." 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437,473,650 A.2d 974 (1994). This 
in turn would "reduce the available assets to manage the risk." Id. In sum, the pro rata 
allocation method promotes judicial efficiency, engenders stability and predictability 
in the insurance market, provides incentive for responsible commercial behavior, and 
produces an equitable result. FN38. 
The Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Co.f 454 Mass 337, 910 N.E.2d 290, 311 (Mass. 
2009). 
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the time on the risk method of allocation set forth 
in Sharon Steel should apply here as it is the only method which is consistent with the policy 
language and it serves important public policy obj ecti ves. Accordingly, Ohio requests that this Court 
answer the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' certified question by ordering that the defense costs 
incurred in defending the Edizone Action should be apportioned as between Ohio, Cloud Nine and 
Unigard based upon the time on the risk method prescribed in Sharon Steel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ohio requests that the Utah Supreme Court answer the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' certified question by declaring that the "other insurance" clauses are not applicable 
in this case as there are no concurrent insurance policies at issue; that Sharon Steel's time on 
the risk method of allocation does apply, and that Ohio is only liable for the defense costs 
incurred during its time on the risk. Such a ruling would be consistent with the terms of the 
policies, this Court's decision in Sharon Steel and would serve important public policy 
objectives. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY and WEST AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants, 
vs. 
CLOUD NINE, LLC, et al., 
Defendants. 
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Intervenor and Cross-
Claimant. 
ORDER 
AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CaseNo.l:05-CV-88TC 
1 
The parties seek a ruling regarding the scope of two insurance companies' duty to defend 
the Cloud Nine Defendants in the separate case of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine LLC, Case N o. 
1:04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah). One of the insurance companies, Unigard Insurance Company, 
agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in Edizone, whereas the other insurance company, 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, rejected the Cloud Nine Defendants' initial tender of 
defense, Unigard, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, contends that Ohio Casualty, 
1 
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like Unigard, has a duty to defend.1 Unigard further contends that Ohio Casualty should share 
equally in paying the costs that Unigard has incurred (or will incur) defending the Edizone case. 
The court finds that the allegations in Edizone5 s Complaint allege an advertising injury 
triggering a duty to defend on the part of Ohio Casualty and Unigard. Also, based on the 
language of the Ohio Casualty and Unigard policies, the court finds that Ohio Casualty must pay 
fifty percent of the Cloud Nine Defendants' defense costs in Edizone, with Unigard paying the 
remaining fifty percent Apcordingly, Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. 
1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
Unigard insured the Cloud Nine Defendants for a portion of the period at issue in the 
Edizone case, and it accepted the Cloud Nine Defendants' tender of defense under a reservation 
of rights when Edizone was filed in August 2004. Ohio Casualty also insured the Cloud Nine 
Defendants for aportion of the relevant period, but it rejected their initial tender of defense, 
Ohio Casualty then filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it has neither a 
duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify the Cloud Nine Defendants. Unigard intervened as a 
plaintiff contending that it also does not have a duty to defend or indemnify, but if it does, then 
*West American Insurance Company is also a plaintiff in this declaratory judgment 
action. But because no one claims that West American has a duty to defend, it is not part of the 
motion before the court (See Unigard's Mem Supp. Mot. Partial Summ J. at p. 20 n.3 
('Unigard finds that the Edizone Suit does not allege a covered advertising injury against the 
Cloud Nine Defendants which occurred during the effective periods of the insurance policies 
issued by West American (June 1998 through June 2001), and therefore does not claim that West 
American has a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants.")-) 
*No disputed facts exist (indeed, the analysis is based on allegations in Edizone's 
Complaint and the policy language). The court will discuss the facts throughout the Order as 
necessary to provide context and analyze the legal issues. 
2 
2 
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so does Ohio Casualty because the policies are essentially identical.3 Additionally, Unigard 
seeks a finding that if both insurers have a duty to defend, Ohio Casualty must share equally in 
paying defense costs (incurred and to be incurred). 
It is important to note that after Unigard filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Ohio Casualty agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants under a reservation of rights, based 
on what it believes are materially new allegations in the Second Amended Complaint filed in 
Edizone. Because Ohio Casualty has since acknowledged a duty to defend from the date of 
Edizone's Second Amended Complaint (filed in January 2006), the duty-to-defend issue raised 
by Unigard's Motion is narrowed to whether Ohio Casualty owed a duty to defend before the 
Second Amended Complaint was filed. 
A. The Insurance Policy 
Ohio Casualty issued a Commercial General Liability Policy to Cloud Nine, LLC, and 
Easy Seat, LLC, for the period of June 10,2001, to June 10,2002. (Ohio Casualty Policy No. 
BKO (02) 52 34 34 82, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Rebecca Hill.) The Policy provided 
coverage for Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" (Coverage B), as follows: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance 
applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" 
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured 
against any "suit" seeking damages for personal and advertising injury" to which 
this insurance does not apply.... 
(Id. at p. 5 of CGL Coverage Form (emphasis added).) According to the Policy, "personal and 
3Unigard's Motion addresses only the duty to defend, not the duty to indemnify. Both 
Unigard and Ohio Casualty contend that no duty to indemnify exists under their respective 
policies. But that is an issue for another day. 
3 
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advertising injury' is an "injury... arising out of one or more of the following offenses:... [t]he 
use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement* " (Id. at p. 13 (emphasis 
added).) "Advertisement" is defined as "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general 
public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of 
attracting customers or supporters." (Id. at p. I D 
The Policy also contains certain exclusions. In particular, the insurance policy does not 
apply to "personal or advertising injury*' that was "caused by or at the direction of the insured 
with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal 
and advertisement injury'" or that arose "out of oral or written publication of materials* if done 
by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity." (M. at p. 5 (emphasis 
added).)4 
B. Edizone's Complaint 
The genesis of the Edizone suit is the alleged breach of a License Agreement allowing the 
Cloud Nine Defendants to manufacture, use and sell patented elastomer gel technology and 
product known as "Gelastic," "GellyComb," and 'Tntelii-Gel" (another name for "GellyComb"). 
In its initial complaint,5 Edizone asserts causes of action for (1) patent infringement; (2) breach 
^Coverage B of the Unigard Policy provides liability insurance coverage for personal and 
advertising injury. The insuring provision of Coverage B of the Unigard Policy is identical to 
insuring provision of Coverage B of the Ohio Casualty Policy. (See Unigard Policy CGL 
Coverage Form at p. 6, attached as Ex. B to Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) The definition of 
"Personal and Advertising Injury" contained in the Unigard Policy is also identical to the Ohio 
Casualty Policy. (See id, at p. 17.) And the definition of "advertisement" and policy exclusions 
in both policies are the same in all relevant aspects. (See id at pp. 6-7,14.) Accordingly, the 
court's ruling on the duty to defend extends to Unigard as well. 
5As noted above, only the allegations of Edizone's original Complaint (or First Amended 
Complaint, which adds defendants but does not change the allegations (see Ex. F attached to Hill 
4 
4 
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of contract; (3) constructive fraud; (4) fraudulent non-disclosure; (5) federal law trademark 
infringement; (6) common law trade name infringement or common law unfair competition; 
(7) deceptive trade practices under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; (8) misrepresentation and 
false designation of origin under the federal trademark act; and (9) conspiracy. (See Edizone 
Complaint, attached as Ex. E to Hill Decl.) 
According to Unigard, Edizone's Complaint triggers a duty to defend under the 
"advertising injury" portion of the Policy because it alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used 
Edizone's "advertising ideas" (the trade names GellyComb, Gelastic, and Intelli-Gel) in tbeir 
advertisement, all to Edizone's detriment. Unigard focuses on Edizone's Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth causes of action to argue that Edizone's allegations trigger Ohio Casualty's duty to defend 
under the Policy's Coverage B for "personal and advertising injur/' liability. 
In its Complaint, Edizone describes its Sixth Cause of Action as "Common Law Trade 
Name Infringement [and] Common Law Unfair Competition." It alleges that the Cloud Nine 
Defendants "have adopted and taken for themselves the use of Edizone's valuable u ade names 
[GellyComb, Gelastic, and/or Intelli-Gel] by using said names in their businesses, on their 
websites, and in conjunction with their goods " (Edizone Compl. % 103, attached as Ex. E to 
Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) Edizone further alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants' use of 
those trade names constitutes "common law trade name infiingement and unfair competition and 
is designed to cause confusion and mistake and to deceive purchasers into believing that 
Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made by, or associated with Edizone." QcL) 
Decl.)) are relevant. The court does not consider the allegations of Edizone's Second Amended 
Complaint, because Ohio Casualty has agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants from the 
date the Second Amended Complaint was filed. 
5 
5 
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Edizone contends that, "[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Edizone will 
suffer, and has suffered, injury to its trade names and its established good will in the market. 
Defendants' acts, misconduct, and misappropriation of Edizone's trade names are also likely to 
cause confusion, mistake, and deceive the public, and have already caused actual confusion. 
Such injuries are irreparable injuries for which there is no adequate remedy at law." (Id. ^ 105.) 
Under Edizone's Seventh Cause of Action, the Cloud Nine Defendants are accused of 
violating the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3, which "prohibits 
persons and companies from engaging in deceptive trade practices." Qd. f^ 108.) Edizone alleges 
that the Cloud Nine Defendants "engaged in many of the deceptive trade practices enumerated in 
[§ 13-1 la-3], including... the causing of confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of their goods or services; o r . . . the causing of confusion 
or misunderstanding as to their affiliation, connection, association with, or certification by 
Edizone." (Id) 
And, finally, Edizone's Eighth Cause of Action alleges "Misrepresentation and False 
Designation of Origin" under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). According to Edizone, the Cloud Nine 
Defendants "appropriated the names GellyComb, Gelastic and/or Intelli-Gel and are using [the 
names] in their own businesses . . . in a prominent fashion." (Id. ^ 110.) In particular, Edizone 
alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants "use the above trade names to get people to their 
businesses, where competing products are advertised and sold using said trade name."6 (Id. 
1113.) 
6The full set of allegations may be found in Edizone's Complaint (in particular, 
paragraphs 101-114), which is attached as Exhibit E to the Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill. 
6 
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C. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. & Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250-51 (1986); Adler v, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
144 F.3d 664,670 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Unigard's Motion involves the interpretation of two insurance contracts and a 
determination of the insurers' rights and obligations under those contracts. Utah law (which 
applies in this diversity action) provides that insurance contracts "are interpreted under general 
contract principles" and that interpretation of such contracts is a question of law to be determined 
by the courts. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthingtoru 46 F.3d 1005,1008 (10th Cir. 1995); see also 
Morris v. Mountain Tel. & Tel., 658 P.2d 1199,1201 (Utah 1983) ("When the existence of a 
contract and the identity of the parties are not in issue and when the contract provisions are clear 
and complete, the meaning of the contrecct can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary 
judgment"). Moreover, in Utah, as a general rule, "an insurer's duty to defend is determined by 
comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint." Fire Ins. 
Exch. v. Estate of Thericelseru 27 P.3d 555 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, the question of whether 
the insurers have a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants and the question of how defense 
costs should be allocated are questions of law. Partial summary judgment on the issues presented 
by Unigard's Motion is appropriate at this time.7 
7Ohio Casualty filed a Rule 56(f) motion seeking a continuance until certain discovery 
could be conducted. The court denied that motion from the bench during the hearing. 
7 
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I I DUTY TO DEFEND 
A duty to defend arises "when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability 
under the insurance policy." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas & Sur., 931 P.2d 127,133 (Utah 
1997). When die allegations, if proven, show "there is no potential liability [under the policy], 
then there is no duty to defend." Deseret Fed. Sav. v. US. Fid. & Guar., 714 P.2d 1143,1147 
(Utah 1986). Under Utah law, the court must interpret the insurance policy as it would any 
written contract, under general contract interpretation principles. Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co, 140 P.3d 1210,1213 (Utah 2006). If one claim or allegation triggers the duty to defend, the 
insurer must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered claims), at least until the suit is 
limited to the non-covered claims. Id. at 1216. Finally, and perhaps most important: '"When in 
doubt, defend.'" Id. at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 
2006)). 
A. The Novell Two-Part Test 
Utah state court decisions have not construed "advertising injury" language in insurance 
policies. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a two-part test to determine 
whether an advertising injury is alleged, and, consequently, a duty to defend is triggered. See 
Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.. 141 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 1998). Under that test, the court must first 
detennine whether the complaint alleges a "predicate offense," that is, "one of the offenses 
specifically listed in the [Policy's] definition of 'advertising injuiy."' Id. at 986. If the first part 
of the test is satisfied, then the court must examine whether there is a causal connection between 
the alleged injuries and the advertising activities. KL 
Applying the Novell two-part test for establishing an "advertising injury" to the Edizone 
8 
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case, the court finds that the allegations set forth in Edizone's Complaint satisfy the two-part test 
and trigger a duty to defend under the policies issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
1. Part One of the Novell Test 
First, Edizone's Complaint alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants committed the 
predicate offense of "use of another's [Edizone's] advertising idea in your [Cloud Nine's] 
'advertisement."' (See Policy at p.3.) Neither the Policy nor Novell define "advertising idea." 
But courts from other jurisdictions have done so. An "advertising idea" is an "idea for calling 
public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to 
increase sales or patronage." Atlantic Mut Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 528 N.W.2d 
486,490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (applying ordinary meaning to term "advertising idea"); see al&o 
Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 852 A.2d 98,109 (Md. Ct. App, 2004) (suggesting that 
advertising ideas are "discrete images or text in an advertisement"); Transportation Ins. Co. v. 
Freedom Elec., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1214,1218 (ND. Ga. 2003) (an advertising idea is "'any 
idea or concept related to the promotion of a product to the public"') (quoting Hvmanv. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins Co., 304 F.3d 1179,1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). The discrete trade names 
of GellyComb, Gelastic, and Melli-Gel expressly describe and promote the gel-like and elastic 
qualities of the material, calling the public's attention to the desirable qualities of Edizone's 
products. Those trade names are "advertising ideas" as that phrase is understood by the average, 
reasonable purchaser of insurance. See Draughton v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc' v, 771 P.2d 1105, 
1108 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (when interpreting insurance contract, court should construe policy as 
it "would be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance"); Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549,1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Utah law and 
9 
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citing Draughton for same proposition). 
Courts also find that where there is no exclusion specific to trademark (as is the case in 
Ohio Casualty's Policy), the phrase "advertising idea" is a broad enough term to include and 
provide coverage for trademark infringement. See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co. of Amer.. 343 F.3d 249,256-57 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that "vast majority" 
of courts conclude that trademark infringement falls within advertising injury coverage for 
misappropriation of advertismg ideas or style of doing business); CAT Internet Servs., Inc. v. 
Providence Wash. Ins. Co,, 333 F.3d 138,142 (3d Cir. 2003) (use of trademarks in connection 
with marketing and sales for the purpose of gaining customers constitutes misappropriation of 
advertising idea); Fro& Switch & Mfg Co., Inc. v; Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742,749 (3d 
Cir. 1999) ("A trademark can be seen as an 'advertising idea': It is a way of marking goods so 
that they will be identified with a particular source [A]Ilegations of trademark infringement 
arguably allege misappropriation of an advertising idea."); Central Mut Ins. Co. v. StunFence, 
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072,1079 (N.D. HI. 2003) (finding duty to defend against trademark 
infringement claim under policy language covering liability for "use of another's advertising 
idea"). See also Novell, 141 F.3d at 985 ("'Ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed 
against the insurer.'") (interpreting Utah law) (citation omitted). 
Certainly Edizone has alleged "use" of those advertising ideas in the Cloud Nine 
Defendants' advertisements.8 For example, Edizone alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used 
*To the extent that cases cited by Ohio Casualty hold that "misappropriation of an 
advertising idea" does not encompass trademark infringement claims, the court finds those cases 
distinguishable because the Policy here contains the common term "use," which is broader than 
"misappropriation" See also Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. StunFence, Inc., 292F. Supp. 2d 1072, 
1079 (N.D. HI. 2003) (distmguishing decisions limiting "misappropriation of advertising idea" to 
10 
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Edizone's trade names "in their businesses, on their websites/' they "compete directly with 
Edizone in the same markets" and such conduct "is designed to cause confusion and mislake and 
to deceive purchasers into believing that Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made 
by, or associated with Edizone." (Edizone Compl. at % 103.) A business's website, except for 
the web pages concerning the business's contact information and history, is generally an 
advertisement for the business's goods, services or products. And certainly a website would fall 
within the Policy's definition of "advertisement": "a notice that is broadcast or published to the 
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose 
of attracting customers or supporters." (Policy at p. 11.) Also, Edizone alleges under its claim 
for Misrepresentation and False Origin that the Clmd Nine Defendants used the trade names 
latelli-Gel, GellyComb, and Gelastic "to get people to their businesses, where competing 
products are advertised and sold using" those trade names. (Edizone Compl. \ 22.) In claiming 
that the Cloud Nine Defendants unlawfully used Edizone's trade names on their websites, 
Edizone is claiming use of Edizone's advertising ideas in Cloud Nine's advertisements. 
Moreover, Edizone alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, which 
specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade practices occurring in advertising. "The 
purpose of [the Utah Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading, and false 
advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11 a-L Clearly, the crux of a 
cause of action for violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is advertising. 
In short, the Edizone allegations fall within the definition of advertising injury as the 
common law tort of misappropriation in part because the policy at issue in StunFence employed 
the word "use," not '^ misappropriation"). 
11 
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offense of'"use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement,'" and the first part of the 
Novell test is satisfied. 
1. Part Two of the Novell Test 
The second part of the Novell test is also met because Edizone's Complaint alleges a 
causal connection between Edizone's injuries and the Cloud Nine Defendants' advertising 
activities. Edizone alleges that it has suffered injury to its trade names as a result of the Cloud 
Nine Defendants' misconduct and it expressly seeks relief prohibiting the Cloud Nine 
Defendants jfrom using the trade names and trademarks on their websites, in advertising or in any 
other way. Those claims show the causal connection between Edizone's alleged injury from the 
Cloud Nine Defendants' use of Edizone's advertising ideas in its advertisements. Cloud Nine's 
advertising activities "caused [Edizone's] injury - not merely exposed it." See Novell, 141 F.3d 
at 989. 
3. "When in doubt, defend," 
Even if the court were to find that Edizone's Complaint presents factual questions or an 
uncertainty regarding whether an advertising injury is alleged, the insurers still have a duty to 
defend until those uncertainties are resolved. "Where factual questions render coverage 
uncertain,... the insurer must defend until those uncertainties can be resolved against coverage. 
'When in doubt, defend."' Benjamin 140 P.3d at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law & 
Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)). 
B. Policy Exclusions 
Ohio Casualty argues that it owes no duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants because 
the allegations in Edizone's Complaint fall within two different intentional act exclusions in the 
12 
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Ohio Casualty Policy. According to those exclusions, the Policy does not apply to personal and 
advertising injury "caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act 
would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal and advertising injury'" or 
"arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured 
with knowledge of its falsity " (Policy at p. 5.) Ohio Casualty contends that these 
intentional act exclusions apply because Edizone alleges, or at least its allegations suggest, that 
the Cloud Nine Defendants knew of their violation of Edizone's rights and knew the illegality of 
their conduct. 
But the causes of action asserted against the Cloud Nine Defendants do not necessarily 
requirfe *hat, in order to find liability, the defendant have knowledge of falsity or knowledge that 
its conduct would cause advertising injury. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (setting forth elements of 
trademark infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (setting forth elements of false designation of 
origin); Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3 (defining deceptive trade practices); George v. H.S. 
Peterson 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983) (discussing the elements of common law trade name 
infringement). 
Courts have found that intentional act exclusions do not negate the duty to defend unless 
there is no potential for liability under the allegations. See, e.g., Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072,1081-82 (N.D. HL 2003) (in trademark action, "insurer 
may refuse to defend only if it is clear from the face of the pleading that all of the allegations in 
the Underlying Action fall outside of the policy's actual or potential coverage") (emphasis in 
original); Elcom Tech., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest 991 F. Supp. 1294,1298 (D. 
Utah 1997) (holding that "knowledge of falsity" exclusion did not negate duty to defend because 
13 
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false advertising claim could be proved by establishing reckless indifference); Union Ins, Co. v. 
Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1213,1217 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (holding that intentional act 
exclusion did not negate duty to defend: "Since intent is not a required element of trademark 
infringement, there could be a finding of liability.,. even if the infringement were innocent"); 
Citizens Ins. Co. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Group, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 547,555 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that intentional act exclusion did not negate duty to defend trademark suit because there 
was potential for liability even if infringement were negligent, reckless, or innocent). 
Given the potential for liability in Edizone's allegations, the exclusions in the Policy do 
not free Ohio Casualty from its duty to defend. This conclusion is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's declaration in Bgniamin regarding the duty to defend alternative theories of 
intentional and unintentional liability. 
Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer to defend claims of unintentional 
injury, the insurer is obligated to do so until those claims are either dismissed or 
otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with coverage. Even where the 
complaint details egregious, intentional conduct, an expected injury exclusion like 
the one found in the Homeewners Policy does not relieve an insurer of its duty to 
defend claims of unintentional injury. Inferences and assumptions about an 
insured's intent to injure are improper and inconsistent both with the well-
accepted practice of alternative pleading and with our oft-repeated instruction that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of the insurance." 
Benjamin, 140 P.3d at 1215-16 (quoting United States Fid, & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 
521 (Utah 1993)). 
For all the foregoing reasons, the court holds that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a 
duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in the underlying action of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine 
LLC, Case No. 1:04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah). 
14 
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PL ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS 
Now that the court has determined that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a duty to 
defend against all of Edizone's claims, the next question concerns how they should share the 
defense costs. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "when apportioning defense costs among 
insxirers, courts 'apply equitable principles . . . unless express policy language decrees the method 
of apportionment'" Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127,140 (Utah 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the Unigard and Ohio Casualty policies have identical provisions for 'Other 
Insurance and Method of Sharing, which provide, in relevant part: 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we 
cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as 
follows: 
a. 
c. 
15 
15 
Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except wheai). below applies. If this 
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of 
the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all 
that other insurance by the method described in c. below. 
Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, 
we will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer 
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of 
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first. 
If any other insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares, 
we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's 
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the 
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total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers. 
(Ohio Casualty Policy CGL Form at p. 10 (emphasis added); Unigard Policies CGL Form at 
p. 13, attached as Ex. B to Hill Decl.) Unigard contends that the "Method of Sharing" provision 
contained in both policies plainly provides for allocation of equal shares, and because there are 
two insurers, the court should find as a matter of law that an equal split of defense costs is the 
appropriate allocation. 
Ohio Casualty contends that the Other Insurance provisions quoted above do not apply 
because the policies are successive, not concurrent. Further, Ohio Casualty advocates the Sharon 
Steel equitable apportionment of costs based on "time on the risk" rather than an equal share 
approach between the insurers. According to Ohio Casualty, it owes 3/45ths in defense epsts 
based on a ratio of months on the risk. The court disagrees. 
Ohio Casualty argues that the method of sharing set forth in the insurance policies' Other 
Insurance provisions only applies to the circumstance in which there are two concurrent primary 
policies, which have overlapping insurance policy periods. Such a limited application isanot 
supported by the specific language of the provisions. Nothing in the provisions' language 
restricts their application to the circumstance of overlapping and/or concurrent insurance. The 
introductory paragraph describes the other insurance simply as insurance which is available to the 
insured for "a loss we cover." The term "loss" is a very broad term, and such "loss" can be 
caused by multiple "offenses" under Coverage B which can span successive policy periods. Had 
the insurers meant to limit the application of the Other Insurance provision to concurrent 
instances only, they could have drafted the language differently. As the policies stand now, there 
is no limiting language. 
16 
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Also, Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation method—which includes allocating a six-
month period of time to the Cloud Nine Defendants (for a period of time during which they were 
unable to find and obtain insurance)—essentially advocates the position that an insurer has a duty 
to defend only those claims covered by its insurance policy. That proposition is directly contrary 
to Utah case law, which requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in the 
same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy. See, e.g., Benjamin 
v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210,1216 (Utah 2006) ('^I]f an insurer has a duty to defend 
one count of a complaint, it must defend them all.'") (quoting Mt Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 
127 F.3d 15,19 (1st Or. 1997)). 
Based on &e plain language of the insurance policies and Utah law regarding the scope of 
an insurer's duty to defend, the court holds that the defense costs in the Edizone case (incurred 
and to be incurred) are to be shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations is GRANTED. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
17 
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IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY and WEST AMERICAN | 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants, 
vs. 
CLOUD NINE, LLC, et aL, 
Defendants. 
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Intervenor and Cross-
Claimant. 
ORDER 
AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
! CaseNo.l:05-CV-88TC 
On November 14,2006, the court granted Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations. The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company filed a Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order 
Allocating Defense Costs. For the reasons sot forth below, Ohio Casualty's 59(e) Motion for 
Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is committed to 
the court's discretion. See Phelps v. Hamiltoru 122 F.3d 1309,1324 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth 
Circuit recognizes only certain grounds for granting such a motion, including those cases where 
18 
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movants can show: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence previously 
unavailable; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Servants of 
the Paraclete v. Does. 204 F.3d 1005,1012 (10th Cir. 2000); BrumarkCorp. v. Samson 
Resources Corp.. 57 R3d 941,948 (10th Cir. 1995). 'Thus, a motion for reconsideration is 
appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the contralling 
law," Servants of the Paraclete. 204 F.3d at 1012. A Rule 59(e) motion should be granted "only 
if the moving party can present new facts or clear errors of law that compel a change in the 
court's prior ruling." Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14,26 (D.D.C. 2001) (quotations & 
citations omitted), affd 35 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1,2002). Further, u[i]n order to show 
clear error or manifest injustice, the [movant] must base its motion on arguments that were 
previously raised but were overlooked by the Court - '[pjarties are not fiee to relitigate issues 
that the Court has already decided.'" United States v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d 670,676 (E.D.Pa. 
2003) (citations omitted). 
Courts routinely deny Rule 59(e) motions in which the movant rehashes old arguments, 
attempts to re-argue more persuasively issues already presented to and addressed by the Court, or 
tries to take a second bite at the apple. See, e.g.. National Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v. 
BarclaysAmerican/Commercial Inc., 899 F.2d 119,123 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing numerous cases 
for proposition that Rule 59(e) motions are commonly rejected where the movant <4was rehashing 
old arguments already rejected by the trial court"); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) ("A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity 
to re-argue a case"); Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000), cert, 
denied, Beverley v. Oto, 531 U.S. 1152 (2001) (motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) 
2 
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which "merely took umbrage with the [district] court's ruling and rehashed old arguments," and 
"did not demonstrate that there was disregard, misapplication or failure to recognize controlling 
precedent... were properly rejected by District Court"); Backlundv. Barnhait 778 F.2d 1386, 
1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding denial of Rule 59(e) motion where motion "presented no 
arguments that had not already been raised"). 
In its motion for reconsideration, Ohio Casualty repeats and re-emphasizes arguments it 
presented to the court during initial consideration of Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The court does not find the arguments persuasive. To the extent Ohio Casualty 
disagrees wife the court's decision, such a matter is for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in the court's November 14,2006 
Order, Ohio Casualty's Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Allocating 
Defense Costs is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 4th day of January, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
3 
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U.S DISTRICT COURT 
BARBARA K. BERRETT [42$)|| NOV 2 1 * P £ U3 
MARK D.TAYLOR [9533] 
BERBETT & TAYLOR, L.C. 01ST R1CT Of UTAH 
Ken Garff Building 
405 South Main Street, Suite l^'nTpUTY CLERK 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 11 
Telephone: (801) 531-7733 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7711 
Attorneys for The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company and 
West American Insurance Company 
IN THE! UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and WEST 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an 
Indiana corporation, UNIGARD INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLOUD NINE, LLC, a Utah corporation; 
EASY SEAT, LLC, a Utah corporation; 
RODNEY FORD, a New York resident, 
individually; BLAINE FORD, a Utah resident, 
individually and REX HADDOCK, a Utah 
resident, individually 
Defendants. 
CLOUD NINE, LLC, a Utah corporation; 
EASY SEAT, LLC, a Utah corporation; 
RODNEY FORD, a New York resident, 
individually; BLAINE FORD, a Utah resident, 
individually; and REX HADDOCK, a Utah 
resident, individually, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
ORDER ON STIPULATED 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 1:05CV00088TC 
Judge Tena Campbell 
RECEIVED 
NOV 2rj 21307 
OFFICE OF 
JUDGE TENA CAMPBELL 
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vs. 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and WEST 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an 
Indiana corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
UN1GARD INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Washington corporation, 
Piaintift&ntervenor and Cross Claimant 
vs. 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and WEST 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an 
Indiana corporation, 
Cross-Claim Defendants 
THE COURT, having folly considered the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, having 
reviewed the record, and for good cause shown, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that all remaining claims pending in the above action are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. This Order shall not abridge any parties' right to appeal the Court's ruling issued 
on November 14,2006 (motion for reconsideration denied on January 24,2007), regarding the 
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allocation of defense costs and all attorneys' fees incurred in the underlying action entitled 
Edizone, LC, v. Cloud Nine, LLC, et. al, Civil No. 1:04CV00117 TS. 
DATED this ^ ldayof ^ Q N ! ,2007. 
BY THE COT 
THE HONORABLE TEfVA CAMPBELL 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BERRETT & TAYLOR, L.C. 
/S/ Barbara K. Berrett 
BARBARA K. BERRETT 
MARK D.TAYLOR 
Attorneys for The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 
and West American Insurance Company 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
/S/Rebecca L.Hill 
RayR.Christensen 
Rebecca L. Hill 
Attorneys for Unigard Insurance Company 
STRONG &HANNI 
VS/ Michael L. Ford 
Michael L. Ford 
Attorney for Cloud Nine, LLC, 
Easy Seat, LLC, Rodney Ford, Blaine Ford and Rex Haddock 
3 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUH 1 8 2009 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Unigard Insurance Company, 
Appellee. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on certification of a 
question of state law by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the 
following question certified to it: 
As to the EdiZone case described by the certification order, 
whether the defense costs should be allocated between Appellant 
and Appellee under the "equal shares7' method set forth in the 
"other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or according to 
the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 {Utah 1997). 
• The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record 
in this matter with this Court. Within fourteen days of the date 
of this order, counsel for*the parties shall advise this Court as 
to what portions of the record they believe necessary for 
consideration of the certified questions. 
Case No. 20090340-SC 
No. 08-4003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 18, 2009, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
REBECCA L HILL 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN PC 
15 W S TEMPLE STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
MICHAEL L FORD 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 TRIAD CENTER STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
BARBARA K. BERRETT 
MARK D TAYLOR 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES LC 
405 S MAIN ST STE 1050 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-0415 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
ATTN: ELISABETH A SHUMKER 
1823 STOUT ST 
DENVER CO 80257 
Dated this June 18, 2009. 
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